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Stalin’s Purge of the Red Army and Misperception of Security Threats 
In James Ryan and Susan Grant (eds) Revisioning Stalin and Stalinism: Complexities, 
Contradictions and Controversies (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020) 
Peter Whitewood	
	
In	June	1937	Iosif	Stalin	sanctioned	an	extensive	purge	of	the	Red	Army	that	was	
not	brought	to	a	halt	until	November	1938.	In	total,	approximately	35,000	army	
leaders	were	discharged	from	the	ranks	and	tens	of	thousands	of	officers	were	
arrested.	Several	thousand	people	were	executed.1	Even	though	over	11,000	
military	personnel	were	soon	returned	to	the	ranks,	this	was	a	shocking	attack	
on	the	institution	vital	for	Soviet	defence.	Indeed,	the	announcement	of	the	most	
high-profile	executions	–	that	of	Marshal	of	the	Soviet	Union,	Mikhail	
Tukhachevskii,	and	seven	other	senior	officers	from	the	high	command	–	
sparked	international	scandal.	Tukhachevskii	and	his	co-defendants,	Iona	Iakir,	
Ieronim	Uborevich,	Boris	Fel’dman,	Robert	Eideman,	Avgust	Kork,	Vitalii	
Primakov	and	Vitovt	Putna,	were	executed	immediately	after	a	closed	military	
trial	on	11	June	that	found	them	guilty	of	organising	a	‘military-fascist	plot’	
inside	the	army.	The	group	was	said	to	have	coordinated	sabotage	and	espionage	
to	ensure	Soviet	defeat	in	wartime.	Another	central	member	of	the	supposed	
conspiracy,	Ian	Gamarnik,	first	deputy	People’s	Commissar	for	Defense,	
committed	suicide	before	the	sentences	were	announced,	after	it	became	clear	
that	he	too	would	be	arrested.	This	group	of	officers	was	publicly	presented	as	
the	nexus	of	a	wider	conspiracy	in	the	Red	Army	that	the	military	purge	was	
intended	to	root	out.		
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In	reality,	there	was	no	foundation	to	these	charges.	There	was	no	
‘military-fascist	plot’	to	weaken	the	Soviet	state	in	a	future	war.	Evidence	
supporting	these	accusations	was	secured	by	the	NKVD	using	violence	and	
torture.	Moreover,	the	accompanying	wave	of	denunciations	that	exploded	from	
summer	1937	–	netting	countless	additional	victims	–	was	the	result	of	officers	
and	soldiers	denouncing	one	another	under	intense	pressure.	Some	Red	Army	
personnel	undoubtedly	denounced	their	comrades	to	save	their	own	skins.	
Others	were	almost	certainly	taken	in	by	press	reports	that	their	superiors	were	
dangerous	subversives	and	action	had	to	be	taken.	The	roles	of	naked	careerism	
or	personal	animosity	cannot	be	ruled	out	either.	In	any	case,	the	damage	caused	
to	the	Red	Army	by	the	military	purge	would	not	have	been	as	extensive	without	
this	combination	of	pressure	from	above	(from	the	NKVD)	and	from	below	(from	
denunciations).2	
What	impact	the	military	purge	had	on	the	Red	Army’s	disastrous	
performance	in	1941	continues	to	generate	debate,	but	nevertheless	it	remains	
remarkable	that	Stalin	would	attack	his	army	in	1937	when	it	was	increasingly	
clear	that	major	war	was	on	the	horizon.	Numerous	explanations	have	been	put	
forward	to	explain	why	Stalin	undermined	his	military	strength	so	precipitously.	
Most	common	is	the	view	that	Stalin	launched	a	premeditated	attack	on	the	army	
simply	to	further	increase	his	power.	The	argument	goes	that	the	military	was	
the	one	institution	that	could	have	potentially	curbed	Stalin’s	insatiable	lust	for	
power	and	thus	needed	to	be	neutralized.3	Central	to	this	explanation	is	the	
NKVD’s	fabrication	of	a	dossier	of	evidence	(on	Stalin’s	orders)	showing	a	
military	conspiracy	implicating	the	Tukhachevskii	group.	Yet	the	dossier	story	is	
based	upon	unreliable	memoir	accounts.	Stalin	also	never	once	referred	to	such	a	
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dossier	in	any	key	meeting	when	the	‘military-fascist	plot’	was	discussed	at	
length.	It	seems	strange	that	he	would	go	to	such	lengths	of	having	evidence	
fabricated	with	the	express	aim	of	giving	credibility	to	planned	executions	in	the	
army	and	then	not	bring	this	up.4		
On	the	other	end	of	the	scale,	some	have	claimed	that	a	real	plot	existed	
inside	the	high	command,	but	these	arguments	are	difficult	to	take	seriously	and	
lack	evidence.5	More	broadly,	in	general	works	on	the	Great	Terror,	the	military	
purge	is	often	presented	as	another	manifestation	of	the	wider	tide	of	political	
violence	that	swept	over	the	Soviet	state	during	1937-8.	The	Red	Army,	in	this	
sense,	was	collateral	damage;	another	institution	into	which	a	wave	of	terror	
spread.6		
None	of	these	explanations,	however,	provides	a	convincing	explanation	
for	Stalin’s	attack	on	the	army.	None	sufficiently	considers	deeper	motivations	
behind	the	military	purge	specific	to	the	Red	Army	and	its	longer-term	roots.	
Indeed,	historians	have	typically	explained	the	military	purge	and	wider	Great	
Terror	by	underling	the	importance	of	proximate	and	contingent	events.	These	
include	the	assassination	of	Sergei	Kirov	in	December	1934,	which	stunned	the	
leadership	and	set	in	motion	a	chain	of	arrests	of	former	oppositionists.7	
Dramatic	events	abroad,	such	as	civil	war	in	Spain,	have	also	been	pointed	to	as	
fomenting	concerns	in	Stalin’s	mind	about	a	‘fifth	column’	in	the	Soviet	Union.8	
Not	discounting	the	importance	of	such	central	events	of	the	1930s	to	the	Great	
Terror	and	military	purge,	this	chapter	points	to	other	–	and	more	long-standing	
–	security	anxieties	that	pre-date	the	1930s	and	are	as	critical	to	explaining	why	
Stalin	attacked	his	army	in	1937.		Moreover,	the	often-neglected	point	about	the	
military	purge	is	that	it	put	Stalin’s	power	and	position	at	risk.	There	was	a	real	
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prospect	of	him	going	to	war	with	much-weakened	defences.	Any	explanation	of	
the	military	purge	has	to	account	for	that	risk.	
This	chapter	will	show	that	the	key	to	understanding	the	purge	of	the	Red	
Army	is	to	see	this	as	the	culmination	of	long-standing	security	anxieties	that	
surrounded	the	Soviet	military	from	its	very	formation	and	that	suddenly	came	
to	a	head	during	the	Great	Terror.	Equally	important	are	Bolshevik	perceptions	
of	a	threatening	international	environment	throughout	the	1920s	and	1930s,	
which	only	exacerbated	concerns	about	the	reliability	of	their	army.		Security	
threats	identified	by	the	early	Soviet	and	then	Stalinist	regimes	could	easily	be	
exaggerated	or	entirely	misperceived.	As	we	will	see,	this	frequent	pattern	of	
misperception	had	devastating	consequences	for	the	army.	In	the	final	analysis,	
the	chapter	will	show	that	Stalin	attacked	the	Red	Army	because	he	and	those	
around	him	misperceived	an	extensive	spy	infiltration	of	the	military	in	the	
summer	of	1937	–	what	was	taken	to	be	a	fifth	column	–	in	the	context	of	
looming	war.	Radical	action	was	the	only	possible	option.	Stalin	did	not	purge	
the	army	to	further	consolidate	his	personal	power;	this	was	a	reactive	decision	
to	a	misperceived	threat,	taken	at	the	last	moment.	In	this	sense,	this	chapter	will	
underline	that	even	though	Stalin	had	consolidated	enormous	levels	of	power	by	
the	1930s,	the	events	of	the	military	purge	demonstrated	the	weakness	of	his	
position.	
Determining	how	a	perceived	military	conspiracy	emerged	during	the	
Great	Terror	and	was	taken	seriously	by	the	leadership	raises	questions	about	
the	limitations	of	source	material.	Specifically,	political	police	interrogation	
transcripts	and	reports	on	confessions	are	some	of	the	sources	used	in	this	
chapter	to	show	how	the	Red	Army	was	identified	as	compromised	by	‘enemies’.	
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There	is	a	risk	in	assuming	that	such	transcripts	are	nothing	but	fabrications	of	
the	NKVD	and	useful	for	little	more	than	seeing	the	ideas	imposed	on	victims	by	
interrogators.		
However,	interrogation	transcripts	can	help	reveal	more	than	just	the	
agenda	of	the	NKVD.	When	examined	in	conjunction	with	other	materials,	this	
can	shed	light	on	the	dynamics	inherent	in	the	evolution	of	conspiracy	theories.	
Notably,	the	same	types	of	conspiracy	theories	are	found	in	the	public	speeches	
and	private	correspondence	of	Stalin’s	inner	circle.	There	was	almost	no	
difference	in	the	manner	in	which	Stalin	and	his	associates	communicated	in	
public	and	in	private.	In	his	personal	correspondence	Stalin	regularly	detailed	
conspiracies	where	they	did	not	exist.9	In	this	way,	as	much	as	the	leadership	
was	influenced	by	the	material	results	and	confessions	and	conspiracies	
emerging	from	political	police	investigations,	the	conduct	of	the	latter	was	
heavily	shaped	from	above.	Recent	research	has	laid	bare	the	complexity	of	
motivations	and	behaviours	among	local	NKVD	officers;	their	levels	of	belief	in	
the	various	plots	and	conspiracies	underpinning	the	Great	Terror,	and	the	
importance	of	overwhelming	pressure	placed	upon	them	to	achieve	results.10	
The	evolving	conspiracy	theories	underpinning	the	Great	Terror	were	a	product	
of	mutually	reinforcing	interactions	between	a	leadership	and	political	police	
both	predisposed	towards	seeing	‘enemies’	in	their	midst.	Moreover,	the	charges	
against	the	senior	officers	in	the	supposed	‘military-fascist	plot’	were	not	merely	
inventions	of	the	NKVD.	The	charges	were	grossly	exaggerated,	but	often	based	
on	real	events	then	framed	in	conspiratorial	terms.	Even	though	there	was	no	
conspiracy	in	the	Red	Army,	by	1937	the	NKVD	had	a	great	amount	of	material	to	
work	with	when	putting	together	the	‘military-fascist	plot’.	
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Civil	war	and	military	vulnerabilities	
	
To	understand	how	Stalin	could	so	badly	misjudge	the	threats	facing	the	Red	
Army	in	1937,	we	need	to	begin	with	the	circumstances	of	its	formation	in	1918.	
After	the	Revolution,	the	Bolsheviks,	critically,	never	wanted	a	standing	army,	
which	they	saw	as	a	tool	of	oppressive	capitalist	powers.	A	people’s	militia	was	
seen	as	a	more	suitable	means	of	defence	for	a	socialist	state.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	the	Bolsheviks	were	not	blind	to	the	need	to	protect	the	revolution	and	
moves	were	made	towards	creating	a	new	‘socialist’	army	in	early	1918.	11	These	
efforts	were	set	on	a	more	conventional	course	as	the	realities	of	war	sunk	in.	
Unsuccessful	peace	negotiations	with	the	German	government	in	early	1918,	the	
renewed	advance	of	its	armed	forces	and	the	signing	away	of	vast	expanses	of	
territory	in	the	Treaty	of	Brest-Litovsk,	were	difficult	lessons	for	Vladimir	Lenin.		
As	well	as	underlining	that	salvation	would	not	arrive	in	world	revolution,	
humiliation	at	Brest-Litovsk	provided	further	evidence	that	the	nascent	socialist	
state	would	not	survive	without	a	proper	means	of	defence.	As	the	former	
Imperial	Army	had	been	dismantled	before	the	revolution,	the	Bolsheviks’	new	
socialist	army	–	the	Workers’	and	Peasants’	Red	Army	–	would	require	serious	
reform.		
The	evolution	of	the	Red	Army	into	the	mould	of	traditional	standing	army	
was	highly	controversial	in	party	circles	on	ideological	grounds.	A	deep	and	
ongoing	problem	was	the	composition	of	the	officer	corps.	The	Bolsheviks	were	
revolutionary	–	not	militarily	–	minded.	Lacking	expertise	in	warfare	they	were	
forced	to	turn	to	former	imperial	officers	–	so	called	‘military	specialists’	–	to	
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staff	leading	positions	in	the	army	(some	of	whom	had	to	be	coerced	into	
serving).	As	a	result,	the	majority	of	Red	Army	officers	in	the	civil	war	had	
previous	service	in	the	former	Imperial	army.	This	was	still	approximately	30	
per	cent	by	the	war’s	end.12	This	large	number	of	military	specialists	created	an	
immediate	security	problem	because	of	questions	about	loyalty.	Looking	back	on	
the	civil	war	in	1923,	Trotsky	recalled:		
	
Of	the	old	officer	corps	there	remained	with	us	either	the	more	
idealistic	men,	who	understood	or	at	least	sensed	the	meaning	of	the	
new	epoch	(there	were,	of	course,	a	very	small	minority),	or	the	pen-
pushers,	inert,	without	initiative,	men	who	lacked	the	energy	to	go	
over	to	the	Whites:	finally,	there	were	not	a	few	active	counter-
revolutionaries,	whom	events	had	caught	unawares.13	
	
There	were	clear	problems	with	employing	military	specialists	who	might	switch	
sides	or	feed	intelligence	to	the	Whites.	Trotsky,	as	a	result,	sanctioned	
punishments	for	the	families	of	military	specialists	who	betrayed	the	
Bolsheviks.14	Each	military	specialist	was	flanked	by	a	Bolshevik	political	
commissar,	establishing	a	system	of	dual-command.	However,	these	safeguards	
failed	to	mollify	objections	from	within	the	party,	which	came	to	a	head	at	the	
Eighth	Party	Congress	in	March	1919.	Here	Lenin	was	forced	to	defend	the	use	of	
military	specialists	from	the	so-called	Military	Opposition,	a	group	of	party	
members	concerned	that,	while	necessary	for	the	war,	the	former	officers	were	
ideologically	closer	to	the	Whites	than	Bolsheviks.15	The	Military	Opposition’s	
position	gained	support	at	the	Congress	and	Trotsky	was	forced	to	give	further	
	 8	
assurances	that	more	controls	would	be	introduced	over	military	specialists	and	
that	political	commissars	would	receive	expanded	powers.	Even	so,	the	principle	
of	employing	military	specialists	was	not	altered,	doing	little	to	ease	distrust	of	
the	bourgeois	outsiders.	For	Lenin,	however,	there	was	no	other	choice.	As	he	
remarked	a	few	months	later,	‘If	we	do	not	take	them	into	service	and	they	were	
not	forced	to	serve	us,	we	would	not	be	able	to	create	an	army.’16	
The	civil	war	did	see	significant	mutinies	by	military	specialists,	such	as	
by	commander	of	the	eastern	front,	Mikhail	Murav’ev.	However,	in	general	terms	
there	is	evidence	that	former	officers	were	in	fact	less	likely	to	desert	than	
communist	Red	Commanders.17	Class	prejudice	was	a	central	driver	of	suspicion	
towards	military	specialists.	In	April	1919	Commander-in-Chief	of	the	Red	Army,	
Ioakhim	Vatsetis,	complained	to	Lenin	about	hostility	towards	the	General	Staff:	
‘Former	officers	who	are	serving	on	our	General	Staff	do	not	deserve	this	unjust	
attitude	[…]	Every	commissar	has	a	secret	desire	to	catch	our	staff	officers	out	in	
some	counterrevolutionary	attitude	or	treachery.’18	A	few	months	later,	Vatsetis	
was	falsely	accused	of	working	for	the	Whites.19		
While	Lenin	and	Trotsky	were	cautiously	supportive	of	military	
specialists,	other	Bolsheviks	like	Stalin	held	similar	attitudes	to	the	political	
commissars	that	Vatsetsis	claimed	were	harassing	the	General	Staff.	During	the	
so-called	Tsaritsyn	Affair	of	1918,	Stalin	(who	had	been	tasked	to	improve	grain	
shipments	from	the	North	Caucasus	to	Moscow)	rounded	on	the	commanding	
military	specialist	Pavel	Sytin,	along	with	his	two	allies	Kliment	Voroshilov	and	
Sergei	Minin.	Partly	a	challenge	to	Trotsky’s	central	military	leadership,	the	three	
dismissed	Sytin	and	requested	that	Voroshilov	be	put	in	charge.	Over	the	course	
of	summer	and	autumn,	Stalin	made	clear	his	distrust	of	military	specialists,	
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referring	to	their	incompetence	and	unsuitability	for	civil	war	combat.20	Stalin	
called	for	limits	on	Trotsky’s	‘erratic	commands’,	claiming	that	these	risked	
‘giv[ing]	the	whole	front	into	the	hands	of	those	deserving	full	distrust,	the	so-
called	military	specialists	from	the	bourgeoisie.’21	In	a	letter	to	Lenin	in	October,	
Stalin	and	Voroshilov	again	criticized	Sytin	as	‘a	man	who	not	only	is	unneeded	
at	the	front,	but	who	is	not	worthy	of	trust	and	is	therefore	damaging.	We	of	
course	cannot	approve	of	the	front	going	to	ruin	as	a	result	of	an	untrustworthy	
general.’22	
Outside	tussles	in	the	party	leadership	over	military	specialists,	the	
Bolshevik	political	police,	the	Cheka,	made	a	priority	of	keeping	an	eye	on	former	
officers	now	occupying	commanding	positions.	The	struggle	against	
counterrevolutionaries	in	the	military	was	one	of	the	Cheka’s	main	priorities.23	
Cheka	leaders,	Feliks	Dzerzhinskii	and	Genrikh	Iagoda,	complained	about	White	
counterrevolutionaries	using	positions	inside	the	Red	Army	to	damage	the	war	
effort.24	Cheka	operatives	launched	investigations	into	treacherous	military	
specialists,	uncovering	strings	of	supposed	plots.25	The	Cheka’s	involvement	with	
the	army	only	grew	throughout	the	civil	war.	The	number	of	Special	
Departments	(Osobye	otdely	[OO])	tasked	to	monitor	the	Red	Army	increased,	as	
did	their	budgets.26	And	it	was	not	only	infiltration	of	the	army	by	White	agents	
and	treacherous	military	specialists	that	alarmed	the	Cheka,	but	also	its	
subversion	by	foreign	spies	-	a	more	pressing	issue	in	the	later	1920s	and	
1930s.27	From	the	Cheka’s	point	of	view,	the	Red	Army	faced	a	risk	of	infiltration	
during	the	civil	war	irrespective	of	military	specialists.	Their	mass	employment	
only	made	matters	worse.		
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The	1920s:	dangers	in	peacetime	
	
Bolshevik	victory	in	the	civil	war	should	have	eased	security	anxieties	
surrounding	the	Red	Army.	The	White	armies	were	defeated	and	the	immediate	
military	threat	to	the	Soviet	state	much	reduced.	Yet	serious	concerns	about	the	
army	continued	unabated.	This	was	for	several	reasons.	Most	importantly,	world	
revolution	had	not	erupted	as	anticipated	by	the	Bolsheviks	in	1917.	Because	of	
this,	they	came	to	view	their	socialist	state	as	surrounded	by	capitalist	powers	
committed	to	its	destruction.	The	unexpected	economic	stabilization	of	the	West	
following	the	First	World	War	and	what	the	Bolsheviks	took	to	be	the	
fundamental	incompatibility	between	capitalism	and	communism,	for	them,	
meant	that	a	final	war	was	inevitable.	The	Bolsheviks	also	never	forgave	the	
assistance	given	to	the	Whites	by	western	powers	in	the	civil	war	and	were	alert	
to	the	continued	hosting	of	their	forces	abroad	and	the	financial	support	
provided	to	them.	All	of	this	helped	sustain	a	sense	of	siege	mentality	and	
encouraged	the	misperception	of	existential	threats	to	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	
interwar	period.28	In	this	context,	it	is	easy	to	understand	why	the	Bolsheviks	
continued	to	fear	that	their	central	means	of	defence	–	the	Red	Army	–	would	be	
subverted	by	hostile	forces.	
Increasingly	stringent	controls	were	placed	on	the	Red	Army	in	the	years	
after	the	civil	war	to	protect	it	from	the	threat	of	subversion.	In	1922,	Trotsky	
prohibited	soldiers	from	having	contact	with	foreigners	without	first	notifying	a	
political	commissar.29	In	1926,	under	Voroshilov’s	military	leadership,	the	
families	of	soldiers	were	banned	from	having	any	contact	with	foreigners.30	
Supposed	spies	were	discovered	in	the	Red	Army	throughout	the	1920s.31	For	
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the	most	part	these	arrests	were	at	relatively	low	level,	yet	the	danger	could	
easily	ratchet	up.	In	1926	when	Jozef	Piłsudski	returned	to	power	in	Poland,	the	
OGPU	reported	an	increase	in	Polish	espionage	and	attempts	to	recruit	within	
the	Red	Army.32			
Security	concerns	common	to	the	civil	war	continued	in	this	climate	of	
insecurity,	especially	the	risk	that	unreliable	military	specialists	might	be	
recruited	by	foreign	powers	to	subvert	the	army	from	within.33	Indeed,	despite	
efforts	to	replace	military	specialists	with	red	commanders,	they	still	occupied	a	
sizeable	number	of	commanding	positions	in	the	1920s	because	of	a	skills	
shortage	in	the	army.34	The	perception	of	the	class	enemy	working	within	
remained	difficult	to	shift,	especially	as	the	Whites	in	exile	held	on	to	hopes	of	
one	day	reversing	1917.	The	GPU/OGPU	reported	on	various	White	schemes	to	
infiltrate	the	Red	Army	and	other	Soviet	institutions	during	this	time.35	Red	
Army	personnel	were	likewise	concerned	about	military	specialists	and	possible	
connections	to	the	exiled	White	movement.	For	instance,	fourteen	officers	raised	
their	fears	in	a	letter	to	the	Central	Committee	in	February	1924	(which	Stalin	
had	distributed	more	widely).36	Moreover,	amnesties	of	White	officers,	running	
through	1920-3,	while	seen	as	a	way	of	depriving	the	Whites	of	soldiers,	in	turn	
created	further	concerns	for	the	GPU	that	subversives	would	infiltrate	the	Red	
Army	under	the	guise	of	returning	soldiers.	A	GPU	circular	from	March	1923	
noted	that		
	
the	activity	of	Wrangel’s	intelligence	and	counterintelligence	organs	
has	increased	on	a	large	scale.	A	number	of	new	intelligence	
institutions	have	opened,	the	main	aim	of	which	is	the	collection	of	
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information	about	the	Red	army’s	condition	and	armament,	as	well	as	
breaking	down	the	morale	of	the	latter	through	planting	agents	in	
commanding	positions.37		
	
The	persistent	climate	of	distrust	towards	military	specialists	in	the	1920s	had	
important	consequences	for	the	later	‘discovery’	of	the	‘military-fascist	plot’	in	
1937.	It	reinforced	a	perception	of	the	‘enemy	within’,	which	was	seriously	
escalated	during	the	Great	Terror.	However,	it	is	important	to	stress	that	certain	
military	specialists	attracted	more	attention	than	others	during	these	years.	
Tukhachevskii,	the	future	leader	of	the	supposed	military-fascist	plot,	was	the	
subject	of	feverish	speculation	in	White	émigré	circles	in	the	1920s.	Many	Whites	
harboured	hope	that	the	young	military	specialist	might	become	a	‘Red	
Bonaparte’	and	unseat	the	Bolsheviks.38	Evidently	these	rumours	did	nothing	to	
halt	Tukhachevskii’s	rapid	rise	in	the	Red	Army.	He	reached	the	position	of	
deputy	chief	of	staff	by	November	1925.	At	this	point,	rumours	of	
Tukhachevskii’s	disloyalty	were	simply	seen	as	rumours	(however	much	the	
Whites	were	taken	in).		
Another	reason	for	the	dismissal	of	rumours	about	Tukhachevskii	was	
that	many	of	these	first	originated	with	the	GPU/OGPU	and	were	used	to	entrap	
White	counterrevolutionaries.	For	instance,	in	the	long-running	Trust	Operation,	
coordinated	by	Soviet	counterintelligence	in	the	1920s	to	gather	information	on	
White	organizations	in	exile,	Tukhachevskii’s	name	(along	with	other	senior	
officers)	was	circled	among	White	emigres	as	a	potential	candidate	for	a	military	
dictator.	By	trading	on	the	speculation	surrounding	Tukhachevskii	–	and	through	
creating	a	fictional	counterrevolutionary	organization	called	the	Monarchist	
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Union	of	Central	Russia	–	Soviet	counterintelligence	hit	upon	an	effective	way	to	
make	contact	with	White	organizations	to	gather	important	intelligence.	The	
Trust	Operation	was	one	of	themost	striking	successes	of	Soviet	
counterintelligence	before	its	final	unmasking	in	1927.39		
Despite	the	obvious	intrigue	of	the	Trust	operation,	it	is	important	to	
stress	that	rumours	about	disloyalty	in	the	high	command	were	never	entirely	
forgotten.	Intelligence	reports	were	produced	about	White	hopes	of	a	military	
coup	against	the	Bolsheviks	and	the	faith	they	placed	in	Tukhachevskii.40	
Paperwork	was	filed	in	the	usual	way.	Even	if	these	reports	were	not	taken	
seriously	in	the	1920s,	there	were	two	major	consequences.	First,	they	gave	no	
respite	to	ongoing	speculation	about	loyalties	at	the	top	of	the	army.	Second,	
when	the	Great	Terror	erupted	years	later,	long-filed	reports	of	disloyalty	in	
Tukhachevskii’s	circle	added	fuel	to	the	fire	at	a	time	when	the	most	tenuous	of	
accusations	achieved	common	currency.		
A	final	threat	identified	to	the	Red	Army	in	the	1920s	was	domestic:	the	
minority	of	officers	and	soldiers	who	supported	Trotsky’s	political	opposition	to	
the	party	majority.	As	Trotsky	was	head	of	the	Red	Army	until	he	was	pressured	
to	resign	in	January	1925,	it	is	unsurprising	that	he	attracted	a	number	of	
military	supporters	who	also	shared	his	objections	to	the	restrictions	on	
democratic	practices	and	the	so-called	bureaucratization	of	party	life	overseen	
by	the	party	majority.		This	small	group	of	Trotskyist	officers	was	by	no	means	a	
threat	to	the	stability	of	the	army	and	was	presented	as	a	lower-order	danger.	
Reports	from	the	Political	Administration	of	the	Red	Army	(PUR),	for	instance,	
frequently	described	Trotsky	military	supporters	as	representing	only	a	small	
minority	and	estimated	their	impact	on	the	ranks	as	limited.41	
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PUR	was	of	course	accountable	for	political	reliability	in	the	Red	Army	
and	had	a	vested	interest	in	presenting	a	harmonious	picture.	There	were	some	
who	disagreed	with	their	assessment.	The	OGPU	was	more	concerned	about	the	
dangers	posed	by	Trotskyist	officers	in	the	second	half	of	the	1920s.	In	the	peak	
year	of	the	United	Opposition’s	activity,	for	instance,	in	November	1927,	head	of	
the	OGPU,	Viacheslav	Menzhinskii,	sent	alarmist	messages	to	Stalin	warning	
about	a	potential	Trotskyist	coup	d’état	with	military	involvement.	Menzhinskii	
claimed	that	officers	were	working	with	Trotsky	to	overthrow	the	party	
majority.	Indeed,	the	OGPU	had	arrested	a	group	of	men	operating	an	illegal	
Trotskyist	printing	press	only	two	months	before,	one	of	whom,	when	
interrogated,	claimed	that	he	was	part	of	a	military	group	planning	a	coup	
inspired	by	Pilsudski.42	In	his	November	letters	to	Stalin,	Menzhinskii	ramped	up	
the	drama,	claiming	that	the	opposition’s	‘secret	combat	organization’	was	
carrying	out	propaganda	in	the	Red	Army,	which	had	been	‘partly	contaminated	
and	[…]	the	commanders	now	are	often	not	reliable	in	the	full	sense	of	the	word.’	
Menzhinskii	was	clearly	pushing	for	a	crackdown	on	the	army	in	his	appeals	to	
the	General	Secretary.43	But	Stalin	rejected	the	OGPU	view	and	favoured	
restraint.	In	his	reply	to	Menzhinskii,	Stalin	argued	that	the	countermeasures	
already	taken	had	made	it	difficult	for	the	opposition	to	make	inroads	into	the	
army.44	There	would	be	no	military	crackdown.	
Menzhinskii	may	have	failed	to	convince	Stalin	of	the	threat	in	1927,	but	
the	OGPU	continued	to	pay	close	attention	to	Trotsky’s	sympathizers	in	the	army.	
Even	after	Trotskyists	were	brought	back	into	the	party	fold,	after	recanting	
their	‘political	errors’	at	the	end	of	the	1920s,	the	OGPU	maintained	observation	
nonetheless.	A	surveillance	file,	for	instance,	was	opened	on	future	‘member’	of	
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the	military-fascist	plot	Vitalii	Primakov	in	the	early	1930s,	which	expressed	
doubts	about	the	sincerity	of	his	break	with	Trotsky.45	The	OGPU	continued	to	
make	arrests	in	the	army	on	charges	of	Trotskyism	throughout	the	early	1930s	
as	it	did	across	other	Soviet	institutions.46	Trotskyism	in	the	Red	Army,	in	this	
sense,	remained	a	live	issue	for	the	political	police,	even	if	former	Trotskyist	
officers	were	now	making	their	way	back	into	central	party	and	military	
positions,	some	with	glowing	endorsements	from	Voroshilov	and	Stalin.47	It	is	
highly	likely	that	some	military	Trotskyists	simply	went	along	with	the	
requirement	to	recant	past	political	affiliations	without	fundamentally	changing	
their	views.	There	is	evidence	that	former	Trotskyist	officers	continued	to	meet	
in	secret	in	the	years	before	the	terror.48	The	OGPU	did	not	entirely	imagine	
underground	Trotskyist	activity	in	the	early	1930s.49	However,	it	was	only	after	
the	murder	of	Sergei	Kirov	in	1934	that	Trotskyism	in	the	Red	Army	became	an	
increasingly	pressing	issue.		
	
The	Great	Terror	and	Military	Purge		
	
For	many	in	the	party	and	political	police,	the	Red	Army	had	proved	itself	
vulnerable	to	internal	subversion	on	several	fronts	in	the	years	after	the	civil	
war.	‘Unreliable’	military	specialists	continued	to	staff	senior	positions;	there	
was	a	risk	of	infiltration	by	foreign	agents;	a	core	of	hostile	Trotskyist	officers	
had	raised	fears	in	some	quarters	about	a	military	coup.	In	reality,	while	these	
security	threats	existed	on	a	certain	level,	they	were	magnified	by	the	isolated	
position	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	world	and	by	a	shared	understanding	among	
senior	Bolsheviks	about	the	dangers	of	capitalist	encirclement.	With	the	political	
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police	already	pushing	conspiracy	theories	about	potential	coups	emanating	
from	the	military	in	the	1920s,	this	foreshadowed	exactly	how	the	political	
violence	of	the	1930s	would	be	justified.	
At	the	same	time,	it	would	be	wrong	to	see	a	rising	wave	of	repression	in	
the	Red	Army	that	culminated	in	the	military	purge	of	1937.	Arrests	came	in	
peaks	and	troughs.	Despite	the	security	anxieties	surrounding	the	army	in	the	
1920s,	there	were	few	arrests	of	supposedly	subversive	infiltrators.50	During	the	
early	1930s,	the	situation	was	very	different.	The	collectivization	drive	sparked	
major	instability	in	the	lower	ranks	as	peasant	soldiers	discovered	how	their	
families	had	been	dispossessed	of	their	lands.51	At	the	same	time,	the	OGPU	
‘unmasked’	what	it	said	was	an	extensive	military	specialist	conspiracy	in	the	
officer	corps	during	1930-1,	with	apparent	ties	to	the	British	and	Polish	
governments.	This	subversive	organization	was	supposedly	planning	a	coup.	At	
the	upper	end	of	estimates,	10,000	people	were	arrested	as	part	of	the	
investigation,	given	the	name	Operation	Springtime.52	Notably,	Tukhachevskii	
was	interrogated	about	his	possible	role	in	the	conspiracy	after	his	name	was	
mentioned	during	the	interrogation	of	another	military	specialist.	Tukhachevskii	
was	said	to	be	sympathetic	to	the	Right	Deviation	and	–	reminiscent	of	the	
rumours	about	him	abroad	–	the	leader	of	a	conspiracy	planning	a	military	
takeover.53	Menzhinskii	wrote	to	Stalin	in	September	1930,	urging	immediate	
action	against	the	‘whole	insurgent	group’,	yet	Stalin	once	again	showed	
restraint,	waiting	two	weeks	to	act	and	delaying	discussion	for	a	meeting	of	the	
Politburo	in	October.54	Following	a	face-to-face	meeting	with	Tukhachevskii	in	
the	same	month,	Stalin	dismissed	the	allegations,	later	pronouncing	him	‘100%	
clean’	in	a	letter	to	Molotov.55		
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Too	much	emphasis	should	not	be	put	on	Stalin’s	dismissal	of	the	
accusations	against	Tukhchevskii.	He	still	accepted	the	premise	of	the	wider	
military	specialist	plot	in	the	Red	Army	uncovered	by	the	OGPU.	Several	
thousand	military	specialists	were	arrested	and	charged	with	working	with	
foreign	powers	and	carrying	out	sabotage.	Moreover,	these	exact	accusations	
would	reappear	in	1937	with	the	key	difference	that	they	would	be	levelled	not	
at	the	distrusted	military	specialist	outsiders,	but	at	the	bulk	of	the	officer	corps,	
including	its	upper	establishment.	A	radical	increase	in	political	tensions	inside	
the	Communist	Party	was	responsible	for	initiating	this	shift	in	focus.		
	
-----	
	
When	Leningrad	Party	Boss,	Sergei	Kirov,	was	gunned	down	outside	his	office	in	
the	Smolny	Building	on	1	December	1934,	the	Red	Army	like	other	Soviet	
institutions	was	subjected	to	increasing	scrutiny.	As	is	well	known,	Kirov	was	
killed	by	a	lone	assassin	–	disgruntled	party	member	Leonid	Nikolaev	–	but	Stalin	
pointed	the	finger	at	the	former	political	opposition,	sparking	an	investigation	
that	would	later	culminate	in	the	show	trials	of	the	1930s.	For	the	army,	this	
meant	growing	OGPU	attention	on	the	small	number	of	former	Trotskyist	
officers	in	the	ranks.	However,	alongside	a	steady	number	of	arrests	in	the	
military	from	this	point	on,	connections	emerged	between	some	former	
Trotskyist	officers	and	the	senior	oppositionists	arraigned	at	the	August	1936	
show	trial.56	This	group	of	former	Trotskyist	officers	–	including	future	
‘members’	of	the	military-fascist	plot,	Putna	and	Primakov	–	was	rounded	up	and	
arrested	in	the	summer	of	1936	and	accused	of	participating	in	a	
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counterrevolutionary	military	organization	connected	to	the	alleged	main	
oppositionist	conspiracy	soon	to	be	publicized	by	the	first	show	trial.	But	
momentum	did	not	stop	there.	Under	the	leadership	of	Nikolai	Ezhov	–	a	dyed-
in-the-wool	conspiracy	theorist	–	the	NKVD	turned	increasing	attention	to	the	
military	in	the	aftermath	of	the	first	show	trial.	Ezhov	was	clear	in	personal	
communication	to	Stalin	in	September	1936	that	there	were	undiscovered	
Trotskyists	in	the	army.	Later	in	December,	at	an	NKVD	conference,	he	
remarked:		
	
I	think	we	have	still	not	fully	investigated	the	military	Trotskyist	line.	
[…]	We	opened	a	diversionary-wrecking	organization	in	industry.	
What	grounds	are	there	to	believe	that	it	is	impossible	to	carry	out	
diversionary	acts	in	the	army?	There	are	more	opportunities	here	
anyway	than	in	industry,	not	fewer.57	
	
Ezhov’s	growing	interest	in	the	Red	Army	(alongside	calls	from	senior	officers	
themselves	to	investigate	more	closely)	saw	rising	numbers	of	arrests	going	into	
early	1937.58	In	this	way,	the	arrest	of	the	small	group	of	former	military	
Trotskyists	in	summer	1936	was	a	key	moment	for	the	later	military	purge.	Yet	a	
question	remains:	how	did	these	arrests	spread	to	Tukhachevskii	and	the	other	
senior	officers	soon	to	be	accused	of	coordinating	the	military-fascist	plot?	
Tukhachevskii	had	not	supported	Trotsky	in	the	political	struggle	after	Lenin’s	
death.	There	was	little	to	tie	him	to	the	arrests	among	the	former	military	
Trotskyists.	Moreover,	while	he	certainly	had	a	strained	personal	relationship	
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with	Voroshilov,	Stalin	had	personally	vouched	for	Tukhachevskii	in	1930	when	
he	could	easily	have	had	him	arrested.	
What	left	Tukhachevskii	fatally	exposed	was	a	shift	in	the	parameters	of	the	
conspiracy	narrative	that	was	driving	forward	the	Great	Terror	in	1937.	At	the	
outset	of	the	growing	arrests	from	the	Kirov	murder,	former	oppositionists	were	
accused	of	participating	in	secret	opposition	networks	and	planning	terrorist	
attacks.	In	the	first	few	months	of	1937,	however,	the	investigations	and	
associated	conspiracies	underpinning	the	terror	took	on	a	stronger	international	
dimension.	The	former	opposition	was	now	said	to	be	working	hand-in-hand	
with	foreign	powers,	particularly	Germany	and	Japan.	This	shift	was	likely	a	
consequence	of	Ezhov’s	conspiratorial	thinking.	Before	taking	over	leadership	of	
the	NKVD,	Ezhov	had	invested	efforts	in	safeguarding	the	Soviet	Union	from	
espionage	and	had	been	closely	involved	in	scrutinising	Soviet	citizens	working	
abroad.59	His	expanded	powers	as	NKVD	head	gave	him	more	influence	from	
1936.	Ezhov	put	more	resources	into	investigating	political	and	
counterrevolutionary	crime	than	his	predecessor	Iagoda,	who	had	paid	more	
attention	to	policing	the	social	order.60	Outside	of	Ezhov’s	efforts,	threatening	
international	events	such	as	formation	of	the	Rome-Berlin	Axis	in	October	1936,	
the	signing	of	the	Anti-Comintern	Pact	in	November	1936	and	the	ongoing	risk	
that	the	Spanish	Civil	War	might	become	a	flashpoint	for	world	conflict,	
undoubtedly	contributed	to	this	shift	in	emphasis	in	the	terror.	All	of	this	put	the	
wider	Red	Army	in	danger.	Arrests	could	now	quite	easily	spread	beyond	circles	
of	former	Trotskyists,	and	a	narrative	quickly	emerged	that	the	army	was	under	
threat	from	foreign	agents.	Clear	indications	of	this	shift	can	be	seen	in	the	
second	show	trial	of	January	1937,	when	the	defendants	were	accused	not	
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simply	of	being	dangerous	former	oppositionists,	but	also	of	working	for	fascist	
powers.61	One	month	later	at	the	February-March	Plenum	of	the	Central	
Committee,	Stalin	pointed	to	a	wide	array	of	dangers	posed	by	fascist	agents,	
supposedly	working	with	Trotsky	and	his	supporters.62	At	one	point	at	the	
plenum	Stalin	chose	to	underline	the	danger	with	a	telling	military	reference:	
	
In	order	to	win	a	battle	during	war,	this	may	require	several	corps	of	
soldiers.	But	in	order	to	thwart	these	gains	at	the	front,	all	is	needed	
are	several	spies	somewhere	on	the	staff	on	the	army	or	even	on	the	
staff	of	the	divisions,	who	are	able	to	steal	operative	plans	and	give	
these	to	the	enemy.63	
	
Ezhov	echoed	Stalin’s	comments	about	the	threat	from	spies	and	saboteurs,	
arguing	that	not	enough	was	being	done	to	expose	them.	He	also	made	reference	
to	a	possible	palace	coup	or	military	plot	in	the	upper	ranks.64	Yet	head	of	the	
army	Voroshilov	struck	a	markedly	different	tone.	Downplaying	the	danger	to	
the	military,	he	claimed	that	very	few	enemies	had	been	revealed	in	the	army,	
which	only	accepted	the	‘best	cadres’.65	Voroshilov	was	certainly	right	on	the	
numbers.	It	was	only	in	April	that	the	NKVD’s	investigation	into	the	military	
started	showing	real	dividends.66	But	Voroshilov	was	clearly	striking	the	wrong	
tone	and	his	efforts	to	downplay	the	perceived	threat	to	the	military	did	not	
succeed.	Indeed,	Molotov	was	most	clear	in	calling	for	a	thorough	checking	of	the	
army,	even	though	there	were,	as	yet,	only	‘small	signs’	of	sabotage.	For	Molotov,	
it	was	natural	to	scrutinize	the	military:	‘If	we	have	wreckers	in	all	sectors	of	the	
economy,	can	we	imagine	that	there	are	no	wreckers	in	the	military?	It	would	be	
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ridiculous.	The	military	department	is	a	very	big	deal,	and	its	work	will	be	
verified	very	closely.’67	
The	presentation	and	acceptance	of	a	subversive	threat	to	the	Red	Army	
at	the	February-March	Plenum	had	immediate	impact.	Soon	enough,	senior	
military	leaders	were	openly	talking	about	spy	networks.	Voroshilov	also	quickly	
scrambled	to	change	his	line.	Dropping	any	effort	to	shield	his	institution,	he	now	
argued	in	a	speech	in	March,	given	to	the	Red	Army	aktiv,	that	not	a	single	enemy	
could	be	permitted	in	the	army	and	that	it	needed	to	be	‘utterly	and	completely	
clean.’68	At	the	same	meeting,	his	deputy	Gamarnik	proclaimed:	‘the	Japanese-
German	Trotskyist	agents,	spies,	and	wreckers	are	in	a	full	range	of	our	army	
organization.’69	
It	was	only	a	matter	of	time	before	the	investigation	swung	towards	the	
high	command.	As	we	have	seen,	Tukhachevskii	had	already	been	subject	to	
rumours	about	his	disloyalty	and	similar	hearsay	circled	again	in	early	1937.	
Soviet	intelligence	agents	and	diplomats	reported	conversations	abroad	of	plots	
and	military	conspiracies,	of	supposed	connections	between	the	Soviet	high	
command	and	the	Nazis.70	Old	and	newly-emerging	rumours	would	appear	more	
credible	than	they	once	did	in	light	of	the	growing	security	concerns	surrounding	
the	army.		Moreover,	as	we	have	also	seen,	Tukhachevskii	had	narrowly	avoided	
arrest	as	a	counterrevolutionary	back	in	1930.	It	is	no	wonder	that	he	fell	under	
the	NKVD’s	gaze	in	spring	1937	when	the	parameters	of	their	Great	Terror	
broadened	beyond	the	former	political	opposition.	
However,	the	key	moment	that	explains	the	timing	of	Tukhachevskii’s	
arrest	in	May	1937	and	the	subsequent	explosion	of	the	military	purge	was	the	
‘discovery’	of	a	supposedly	extensive	spy	infiltration	in	the	army	that	same	
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month.	On	10	May	Voroshilov	reported	to	Stalin	about	a	serious	infiltration,	
admitting	that	the	army	had	been	significantly	compromised	by	foreign	agents	at	
all	levels.	Sabotage	and	espionage	were	widespread.	According	to	Voroshilov,	
serious	damage	had	already	been	done	and	urgent	action	was	needed,	
particularly	the	scrutiny	all	officers	in	all	areas	of	the	army.71	This	report	
coincides	exactly	with	the	first	action	taken	against	Tukhachevskii	and	the	group	
of	senior	officers	who	would	be	presented	as	the	leaders	of	the	military-fascist	
plot	one	month	later.	Tukhachevskii	was	demoted	the	very	day	that	Voroshilov	
sent	his	report	to	Stalin.	In	this	way,	it	is	likely	that	the	unearthing	of	this	
supposed	‘spy	infiltration’	gave	Stalin	the	push	he	needed	to	have	Tukhachevskii	
arrested	and	launch	a	devastating	purge	of	the	Red	Army.	And	the	spy	scare	itself	
was	an	extension	of	the	rising	security	concerns	surrounding	the	Red	Army	
evident	from	earlier	in	the	year.	Moreover,	Stalin	seems	to	have	had	espionage	
firmly	on	his	mind	at	this	time,	having	written	a	long	article	for	Pravda,	
published	also	in	May,	which	underlined	the	threat	from	fascist	agents	to	the	
Soviet	state.72	But	still,	it	was	a	major	risk	to	launch	a	destabilising	purge	of	the	
army	when	the	country	was	gearing	up	for	war.	Stalin	had	exercised	restraint	in	
the	past	when	he	rejected	Menzhinskii’s	call	to	crackdown	on	the	army	in	1927	
and	when	he	let	Tukhachevskii	off	the	hook	in	1930.	Stalin	would	not	attack	his	
army	without	good	reason.	During	the	first	months	of	1937,	he	probably	waited	
to	see	what	came	up	in	the	NKVD’s	investigation	into	the	military,	but	as	soon	as	
Voroshilov	reported	on	an	extensive	spy	infiltration	in	May	–	affecting	all	levels	
of	the	army	–	there	was	no	other	choice	but	a	mass	purge.	How	could	he	go	to	
war	with	an	army	compromised	in	such	a	way?	The	gamble	of	a	purge	could	not	
be	avoided.	
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------	
	
Stalin	attacked	his	army	because	of	a	spy	scare	in	the	military	in	summer	1937.	
This	spy	scare	was	given	credibility	because	the	Red	Army	had	been	judged	as	
vulnerable	to	subversion	for	nearly	two	decades.	Long-standing	security	
concerns	had	circled	the	army	since	its	formation:	from	‘unreliable’	military	
specialists	to	spies,	foreign	saboteurs	and	domestic	Trotskyists.	Supposed	
‘military	conspiracies’	of	different	stripes	had	been	‘exposed’	in	the	twenty	years	
before	the	1937	purge.	There	was	rarely	a	moment	from	its	formation	in	1918	
that	the	Red	Army	was	not	subject	to	questions	about	its	reliability.	These	long-
standing	security	concerns	came	to	a	dramatic	head	during	1937.	In	the	
aftermath	of	the	Kirov	murder,	the	arrests	of	a	small	group	of	former	Trotskyist	
officers	in	1936	swung	attentions	more	firmly	towards	the	army.	This	gave	the	
NKVD	an	opening	to	scrutinize	the	military	more	deeply.	As	the	parameters	of	
the	terror	widened	in	1937,	this	then	provided	the	opportunity	and	momentum	
for	arrests	to	move	beyond	the	danger	of	Trotskyism.	In	this	respect,	the	Great	
Terror	alone	was	not	enough	to	spark	the	military	purge;	nor	were	long-standing	
security	concerns	that	had	trailed	the	army	since	1918.	It	was	a	combination	of	
long-standing	anxieties	about	the	reliability	of	the	military	and	the	sudden	
eruption	of	political	violence	in	the	Great	Terror	that	left	the	Red	Army	fatally	
exposed.		
	 This	explanation	of	the	military	purge	has	implications	for	how	we	
understand	the	nature	of	Stalin’s	power.	From	the	late	1920s,	Stalin	spearheaded	
a	radical	transformation	of	Soviet	military	and	industrial	power	in	anticipation	of	
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major	war	with	the	capitalist	world.	However,	at	the	same	time,	Stalin	and	his	
circle	could	easily	exaggerate	or	totally	misperceive	security	threats	to	the	Soviet	
state,	causing	the	regime	to	lash	out	in	unpredictable	ways.	As	this	chapter	has	
shown,	the	Red	Army	fell	victim	to	such	misperceived	conspiracies	in	1937,	
doing	much	to	severely	destabilize	the	institution	critical	for	defence.	Stalin	
exercised	vast	control	over	the	Soviet	state	by	the	1930s,	but	did	much	to	
undermine	its	strength	through	misperceiving	the	nature	of	security	threats.	In	
this	way,	Stalin’s	ability	to	build	with	one	hand	and	destroy	with	the	other	
defined	the	nature	of	his	power.	
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